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The Decline of Professionalism
REBECCA ROIPHE*
ABSTRACT
Traditionally, professionalism conceived of the professions as central to
democratic society. Because professionals gained their status through reputation
not wealth, they were in the best position to suppress their own self-interest in
order to ascertain and pursue the public good. This Article argues that this
traditional understanding of the professions was lost as a market ideology took
hold in the 1970s. Professionalism gradually became synonymous with the delivery
of services. This Article draws on this intellectual history to argue that aspects of
the traditional concept of professionalism can and should be revived today.
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INTRODUCTION
Professionalism was a casualty of the 1970s. It was lost in the shuffle as the
culture shifted from one that emphasized the importance of the social and the
value of a carefully coordinated national community to one that focused on
the power of the individual and smaller more parochial groups.1 This article
explains the fate of professionalism and its decline as a case study in the
intellectual and cultural shift that ushered in the final decades of the twentieth
century. In doing so, it seeks to accomplish three goals. The first is to expose the
myth of the inevitability of a market understanding of the profession. The second
is to uncover aspects of the older understanding of professionalism that can and
should be relevant and vital today even after the shifts that we all experience as
natural and inevitable. The third is to contribute to a growing historical
understanding of the embrace of a free market ideology in the last third of the
twentieth century.
Professionalism came of age in the Progressive Era.2 It thrived in a time in
which science and expertise occupied an exalted position in the collective
imagination.3 Scientific fields of knowledge seemed to offer the answers to
myriad social ills, which were otherwise mysteriously locked in the complex
organism of society.4 The increasingly urban industrial economy offered so much
promise to some but left others with relatively little.5 Class warfare, industrial
accidents, and urban unrest seemed all but inevitable. Generations worried about
how to coordinate and contain the destructive forces of capitalism, and in this
context, the social sciences were catapulted into the spotlight.6 As the rapidly
changing economy altered our physical and social terrain, government and
society in general turned to the well-trained expert to help preserve fairness,
justice, and progress in an increasingly complex industrial world.7
Progressive reformers believed that government could provide part of the
solution but politicians were susceptible to corruption and capture. Science,
however, was not. Social science associations burst on the scene. Experts took
1. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 4 (2011) [hereinafter RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE].
2. THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY v (1977); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER, 1877 1920 117 (1967).
3. BURTON J. BLEDSTEN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 80-128 (1978) (explaining how a new middle class developed an ideology and
culture of professionalism in the late nineteenth century).
4. Id.
5. See generally WIEBE, supra note 2 (arguing that urbanization and industrialization threatened conven-
tional understandings of the individual and society).
6. See generally HASKELL, supra note 2 (describing the emergence of the professional social sciences as a
case study in the movement toward professionalization); DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1991) (arguing that the social sciences emerged in the late 1890s as a way to promote harmony and
direct change in a democratic society).
7. See WIEBE, supra note 5, at 111-33; HASKELL, supra note 2, at 199.
[Vol. 29:649
THE DECLINE OF PROFESSIONALISM
their place in the newly minted regulatory state.8 And professionals did too.
Journalists, scholars, policy makers, and others agreed that the country needed
groups of individuals trained in the social sciences to navigate the complex urban
terrain. The diverse new interests and the vast economic expansion called out for
coordination and the project of the first half of the century was to seek to
understand, master, and improve the social world. Lawyers thrived in this
climate, as did the rhetoric of professionalism.
An older form of professionalism, which I will call social professionalism,
conceives of the professions as groups of individuals who have mastered an area
of knowledge through special training. Because th y gain their power through
knowledge-not wealth or political prestige-professionals are uniquely suited
to ascertain what is best for the public as a whole and to suppress their own
immediate interests in achieving it.9 This idea of the nature and the power of
professionals was both a product of, and an integral part of, a particular kind of
liberalism that thrived for the most part of the twentieth century.
Throughout the first sixty to seventy years of the twentieth century, most
Americans believed that the nation could only survive the late industrial
economy if they found and articulated shared norms.1 0 To do so, the country
needed an organized and expert response to the increasingly diverse and
pluralistic society. Sociologist Emile Durkheim made the point. Capitalism, he
argued, will self-destruct unless it is contained within a society defined by mutual
interest. 12 It was the task of the professional, the scientist, and the expert to help
with the process of articulating and implementing these values. 13
According to social professionalism, it is precisely because professionals gain
their power and status from knowledge not from any direct personal gain that
they are able to think beyond their own interest to pursue the social good. 14 Their
knowledge and experience help them understand the long-term interests of the
public rather than substituting their own immediate gain for the greater good.
1 5
Professionals would be able to negotiate the interests of the people with that of
8. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877 1920 (1982).
9. See generally MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1979); Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 370
(1964) [hereinafter Parsons, A Sociologist Looks].
10. See generally WIEBE, supra note 2 (arguing that the consequences of a new industrial economy
demanded a new more purposeful articulation of shared norms and communal goals).
11. See HASKELL, supra note 2; Ross, supra note 6.
12. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 23 25 (1957) [hereinafter DURKHEIM,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS]; EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY XXX xxxix (MacMillan Press
1984) (1893) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR].
13. Parsons, A Sociologist Looks, supra note 9, at 375.
14. LARSON, supra note 9 (defining professionalism by referring to the function professions play in
articulating and helping to pursue shared values).
15. LARSON, supra note 9.
2016]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
the state without being subsumed by either the destructive forces of the market or
the corrupting nature of state power. 
16
At the end of the nineteenth century, Durkheim wrote that professionals were
intermediaries who could negotiate the interests of individuals with the demands
of the law or state. 17 They were perfectly situated to coordinate the vast and
varying interests in society to help obtain what was best for all.18 Neither the
market nor the state could ensure that the war of each against all would not end in
annihilation. Only discrete professions could do that. The market wreaked
destruction, chaos, and inequity, and the government was prone to corruption and
too removed from everyday life to ensure the good of all. No matter how
carefully and scientifically ordered the laws and government were, the country
would always need individual experts and professional groups to exercise
judgment and unite diverse groups into a constantly evolving social order.
Lawyers were uniquely suited to do just that.19
From the inception of social professionalism in the late nineteenth century,
lawyers and scholars have been skeptical about whether the profession lives up to
this ideal and some doubt that there was ever a point at which it really served this
role.20 But despite the perpetual doubt, the rhetoric dominated in the Progressive
Era and for many decades after that.21 However, the idea of social professional-
ism has receded recently.22 Perhaps it still animates some bar discussions and law
school graduation speeches, but the vast majority of practitioners and commenta-
tors have embraced a market understanding of the lawyer's role, in which the
profession is essentially seen as the delivery of services to clients in need.23
Social professionalism, like a family heirloom stuck in the back of a closet, is
maintained but largely ignored.24 This article seeks to understand why. In
answering that question, it will also expose the sense of inevitability as a myth.
16. LARSON, supra note 9.
17. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 12, at 23-24.
18. See generally DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 12, at 23 24; ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM
OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 1-33 (1988); LARSON, supra note 9; Parsons, A
Sociologist Looks, supra note 9.
19. See LARSON, supra note 9, at x-xiii.
20. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 48 68 (1988); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). For a critique of the idea that
lawyers' ethics have declined, see Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the
Ideology ofAntebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1427-47 (2003).
21. See WIEBE, supra note 2, at 111 33; HASKELL, supra note 2 at 1 2; LARSON, supra note 9, at 138-45;
BLEDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 80-129.
22. Dana Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism (UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2676094, Apr.
30, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-2676094 [perma.cc/KN72-TDNF].
23. Id.
24. Some scholars have gone further than simply ignoring the concept and have advocated that it be
abandoned entirely. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66 70 (2010); RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 10 11 (2008). See generally
Richard Greenstein, Against Professionalism, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327 (2009).
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The contemporary view of the profession is contextual, not necessary and
unavoidable. It would be naive to import the older version unchanged into a very
different environment, but the history of why social professionalism has gone out
of style will help us begin to understand what can be preserved in a changed
climate.
Part I of the article explains how and why the professions were seen as so
critical in post-industrial America. Part II explores the relevant cultural, political,
economic and intellectual shifts of the last third of the twentieth century that
replaced this older vision with one focused on individuals and voluntary action.
Part III explains how social professional ideology was lost in this shift by
analyzing how lawyers talked about their work and their role in society during the
1970s and 80s. Increasingly, lawyers framed their own position in society in
market terms. Finally, the article concludes by suggesting that the bar revive
positive aspects of the professional role from the social liberal tradition. By
adapting aspects of the older vision to the current view of the professional, the bar
will be able to develop a new version of professionalism that can survive, in light
of the massive cultural changes of the last few decades.
I. THE HEYDAY OF PROFESSIONALISM
The professions thrived in the years following the Civil War. The war had
ushered in an era of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Older understand-
ings of free contract, free labor, and individual self-determination could not
survive this shift unchanged.
Nineteenth-century free labor ideology, like liberalism in general, was built on
the assumption that individuals should be free to act as they choose consistent
with the rights of others.2 6 A passion for freedom of contract characterized this
early period.27 But the realities of industrialization forced scholars, journalists,
and judges to recognize that left to its own devices, the nation might not fare so
well.28 The country had to pay attention to the social order and how individuals fit
within it.29 At the dawn of the welfare state, scholars and policymakers were
preoccupied with the institutions and systems in which individuals operated.30
Social responsibility replaced individual grit and self-determination as the theme
of the day and politicians and critics increasingly posed collective solutions to the
25. For a discussion of the dominance of free labor and free contract ideology after the Civil War, see AMY
DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF
EMANCIPATION (1998); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
26. WITT, supra note 25, at 45.
27. See STANLEY, supra note 25, at 1 33.
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problems of unbridled capitalism. 31 The reality of interdependence in the modern
urbanizing economy forced the architects of the regulatory state to think in terms
of institutions and structures. Those responsible for building the nascent state
were preoccupied with how to make society work and how to coordinate
individual action so the social whole would cohere.32 As historians and
sociologists have observed, the project was never pure.33 Masked in the
comfortable seemingly neutral guise of science, social scientists were motivated
by political concerns and their policies were shaped by self-interest and
preoccupations with their own status.3 4 But regardless of the motivation of the
rising class of experts, the reality of the modern industrial world seemed to call
for a coordinated response. The Progressives embraced an emerging bureaucracy,
combined with a supposedly meritocratic order determined by professional
achievement and educational accomplishment.35 The social sciences were built
on a faith that society is separate from the economy. It rested on the assumption
that society is defined in non-economic terms and requires a class of individuals
who are trained in one of the fields of knowledge to master it. Social relations
were considered not only distinct from the market but also necessary to curb the
excesses of a capitalist economy.
36
Just as reformers sought to use social science to control the effects of
capitalism, intellectuals too developed a worldview that undermined the premise
of a pure market economy. Pragmatism, elaborated through the writings of
William James, John Dewey, Charles S. Pierce, and others undermined the
classical notion of a disembodied free individual acting in his own rational
self-interest.37 The individual, pragmatists argued, was always formed and
bounded by social context. The idea of selfhood was entirely incoherent without a
31. Id.; see also STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877 1920, at 1 18 (1982). Commentators have argued that the idea of state
regulation of the economy came much earlier than the Progressive Era, with precursors of the regulatory state
occurring throughout he nineteenth century. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH- CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
32. Ross, supra note 6; HASKELL, supra note 2.
33. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) (arguing that the professionalization project
was about market control); LARSON, supra note 9, at 104-36 (arguing that the professional project was about
securing status through market control); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) (focusing on the way in which the profession gained authority by
excluding outsiders); MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (1988) (explaining how the profession established itself by creating
ethnic and class distinctions).
34. AUERBACH, supra note 33; ABEL, supra note 33.
35. MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, A PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 12 (2001).
36. See generally id.; Ross, supra note 6; HASKELL, supra note 2.
37. See generally 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (Harvard U. Press 1981) (1890); John
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, in 14 THE MIDDLE WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 1, 96 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1988)
(1922); Charles Sanders Peirce, What Pragmatism Is, in PRAGMATISM: THE CLASSIC WRITINGS 113 (H.S. Thayer
ed., 1982).
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notion of society to provide context and meaning.38
In the early twentieth century, the United States was preoccupied with the
question of how to coordinate social interaction, such that the interdependence
did not devolve into warfare, destruction, and waste. In economic terms,
observers questioned the efficiency of competitive markets and called for
coordination and rationalization.39 People disagreed over how best o solve the
problem, but for the most part, they framed the question in the same way. The
greatest issues of the day were seen as problems of coordination, efficiency, and
cooperation.40 Individuals left to their own devices might well destroy each other
and the community as a whole.4 1 Progress and the just society would not
necessarily result from free labor. The key was to carefully contain and direct
autonomous and self-interested individuals to serve society as a whole.42 Experts,
particularly those with knowledge of social science, were seen as critical to this
cause.4 3 A rational and scientific approach to the workplace was necessary to
control the inefficient and wasteful side effects of unrestrained markets. What
might seem like the result of individual choice and action was, in reality, a
probabilistic consequence of multiple actions. If the country focused solely on
the individual, it might miss the opportunity to regulate and control those
probabilities in an efficient manner.44 It was not that individualism lost hold, but
it was now accompanied by, and subordinate to, an urgent need to attend to
systems and institutions in which individuals operated. Sociologists looked to
work and the professions in particular to hold society together. The rights of
property, private initiative, and competition were secondary to the virtue of
cooperative action. Understanding and perfecting social order was seen as the
ultimate goal. By the 1940s, Talcott Parsons argued that American society had
moved beyond capitalism and that the dichotomy between capitalism and
socialism was no longer relevant.46
38. See generally Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001); JAMES LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1850 1940 (1997).
39. In the 1920s and 30s, there developed an important countercurrent. Free market economists argued that
the country's woes were due to too much government intervention and called for a return to laissez-faire
principles. The Great Depression invigorated this group of economists associated most prominently with the
London School of Economics. See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE
THE DEPRESSION 12 54 (2012). But even the economists themselves admitted that they were somehow out of
pace with the contemporary worldview. See id. at 1 8.
40. See id. at 1 8; RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 1 11.
41. WITT, supra note 25, at 142-43.
42. See WITT, supra note 25, at 142-43.
43. For a survey of the literature on expertise in the Progressive Era, see Rebecca Roiphe, The Most
Dangerous Profession, 39 CONN. L. REV. 603, 612 21 (2006).
44. WITT, supra note 25, at 142-43.
45. Id. at 108.
46. See Talcott Parsons, "Capitalism" in Recent German Literature: Sombart and Weber, 36 J. POL. ECON.
641, 641-43 (1928).
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While there were significant breaks and changes in thought from the
Progressive Era through the 1960s, some themes remained remarkably consistent-
what historian Harold Brick refers to as "social liberalism.,47 Unlike the
market liberalism that dominates today, social liberalism mandates that the social
structure embody long-term shared values. Its premise was that liberal democ-
racy must attend to the social realm to ensure justice and progress. While the
view was not necessarily radical and was consistent with a market economy, a
more egalitarian and reformist principle mixed with and tempered the faith in
laissez-faire policy.48 In 1920, R.H. Tawney, a British historian and economist
who had a strong influence in America as well, diagnosed the problem of the
modern industrial world as an excess of acquisitiveness. He argued that the
solution lay in the professionalization of all occupations.49 According to Tawney,
society had grown to worship rights rather than function. Rights ought to be
subordinate to what citizens make, create, or achieve.5 0 The acquisitive society,
"makes the individual the center of his own universe, and dissolves moral
principles into a choice of expediencies.5' The professions, however, "carry on
their work in accordance with rules designed to enforce certain standards both for
the better protection of its members and for the better service of the public.",5 2 If
all occupations were to be professionalized, the measure of worth would be
services that they perform rather than the financial reward they yield. 3 Like
Talcott Parsons, Tawney believed that individual rights and freedom ought to be
in service of a social goal.54 At the time, Tawney's view was emblematic of a
general attitude> Cultural critics at the time shared the sense of revulsion at the
amorality of market individualism and embraced the promise of the technocratic
elite.5 6 Scientific management, in Frederick Winslow Taylor's terms, could bring
47. See HOWARD BRICK, TRANSCENDING CAPITALISM: VISIONS OF A NEW SOCIETY IN MODERN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 10 11 (2006).
48. See id.
49. See R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 36 37 (1920).
50. Id. at 29. For an insightful discussion of Tawney and his relationship to the functional sociologists and
the later critique of professionalism, see Thomas L. Haskell, Professionalism Versus Capitalism: R.H. Tawney,
Emile Durkheim, and C.S. Pierce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities, in THE AUTHORITY OF
EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY 180 (Thomas L. Haskell ed. 1984) [hereinafter Haskell,
Professionalism Versus Capitalism].
51. TAWNEY, supra note 49, at 31.
52. Id. at 92.
53. Id. at 94.
54. Id. at 1 7.
55. Haskell, Professionalism Versus Capitalism, supra note 50, at 182.
56. See generally WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST
(1914); FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911); HERBERT CROLY, THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909); WILLIAM JAMES, THE ENERGIES OF MEN (1907); EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING
BACKWARD (1888). For a brilliant discussion of the transatlantic community of intellectuals who challenged
laissez-faire liberalism, see EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFC NATURALISM
& THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973) [hereinafter PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY]. See also JAMES T.
KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
[Vol. 29:649
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efficiency to all areas of life.5 7 Renowned social critic, Walter Lippmann, argued
that science and knowledge would bring order to a system subject to the moral
drift of individualism and self-interest.5 8 William James similarly articulated a
growing faith in education to serve as a break on popular passions, which tend to
lead the country astray.59 In 1907, he explained that the educated intellectual was
responsible for guiding the country, like the "aristocracy in older countries.,60 He
explained that intellectuals "stand for ideal interests solely, for we have no
corporate selfishness and wield no powers of corruption.,6 1 James argued that we
must extend education to all, rather than confine it to the elite, so that the country
can approach truth and justice.62
Freedom in this context did not mean exactly the same thing as it does today.
Work framed all social interaction and the key was to use the workplace to forge a
consensus out of increasingly diverse pieces. The more cultures that were thrown
together in urban America, the more important it became to find commonality to
legitimatize social and political forces.63 Parsons believed that work provided an
arena to develop those common values.64 The workplace was the site for social
conflict and the destination for social control.65 Freedom to pursue one's
livelihood in the way one chose was the most prevalent way to frame the notion
of liberty. Louis Brandeis, like Parsons and Tawney, viewed the professions-
especially the legal profession-as key to the process of socialization. According
to Brandeis, occupations and professions are fundamental in helping individuals
adapt to the social whole and inculcating common values in an ongoing way.
Because lawyers, in particular, are charged with understanding and pursuing
fundamental values, like justice, they provide an important function in socializ-
ing their clients. The professional defines her goals as those of the occupational
group and the larger society. By interacting with clients and the law, lawyers
THOUGHT 1870 1920 (1986). For a discussion of the social gospel of efficiency, see SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY
AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1890 1920 (1964).
57. TAYLOR, supra note 56.
58. LIPPMANN, supra note 56.
59. WILLIAM JAMES, THE SOCIAL VALUE OF THE COLLEGE BRED (1907), reprinted in WILLIAM JAMES, ESSAYS,
COMMENTS, AND REVIEWS 106 (Harv. Univ. Press 1987).
60. Id. at 110.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 106 12. Thorstein Veblen similarly viewed the intellectual as the key to justice and the
democratization of education as the only way to ensure equality and fairness. Veblen wrote, "[1]earning has so
far become an avowed 'end in itself' that 'the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men' is now freely
rated as the most humane and meritorious work to be taken care of by any enlightened community or any
public-spirited friend of civilization." THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 10 (1918).
63. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, FREEDOM 72 (1988).
64. See generally Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY (1964).
65. See generally id.
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continuously work to redefine and reinforce those shared values.6 6 The fact that
many social critics converged on work and society as a way to ensure justice and
progress by no means suggests that there was any kind of consensus. The debate
raged in the first half of the century, just as it does now with those on the right and
those on the left disagreeing about fundamental political principles. But, those
critics were united in the way they conceived of both the problem and the
solution.67 The Progressive Era left us with railroad regulation, income tax, labor
law, and agricultural subsidies. All of these programs were experiments in social
planning, attempts to mitigate the harsh effects of the market by engineering the
social world.
Economists in the first half of the century similarly viewed the problem from a
collectivist's stance. While of course some advocated free market ideology, even
these more conservative economists conceded the importance of social plan-
ning.6 8 In the 1910s and 20s, economists seemed to agree that the goal was to set
standards for social welfare and make sure that the laws of the market conformed
to those ideals.69 Inspired by Thorstein Veblen, institutionalist economists in the
early twentieth century argued that economic theory had to take into account
values such as a fulfilling work life, an opportunity to help shape one's work
environment, and the ability to develop talent.70 Anthropology, social psychol-
ogy, and sociology were necessary to understand communal life. It was
impossible to conceive of economic reform without a scientific understanding of
social context. The marginalist economists, very much in vogue in the Progres-
sive Era, undermined support for a laissez-faire economy. Ultimately supporting
income tax and other welfare programs, the marginalists argued that investment
in the poor would result in greater social good than investment in the rich.7 1 In
1932, Adolf Berle, Jr. and Gardiner Means published The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, which argued that corporations should be compelled to act
in the public interest.72 Like the institutionalists, Gardiner and Means advocated
collective control over economic life.
73
Economic theory blended with anthropology and sociology in the Progressive
Era. Taking its cue from Veblen as well as the marginalist economists, the next
generation of thinkers grew from a variety of disciplines, and economics fed on
66. See generally Louis D. Brandeis, Business A Profession, in BUSINESS A PROFESSION 1 (1914). For a
discussion of the Progressive approach to the profession, see William H. Simon, Babbit vs. Brandeis: The
Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 566 (1984).
67. See BRICK, supra note 47, at 3. Brick labels this entire period from the Progressive Era through the 1960s
as "post-capitalist," a time in which critics argued that the country had moved beyond capitalism to a different
more just social order. See BRICK, supra note 47, at 4-8.
68. See BRICK, supra note 47, at 67 69.
69. See Id.
70. Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 174 76 (2001).
71. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836 1937, 191 92 (1991).
72. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
73. Id.
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the theories and methodologies of the social sciences. Assimilation and social
integration were central to social and economic planning. The new immigrant
class, which many feared posed a radical threat in the early part of the century,
would gradually shed the ethnic mentality and become a part of the melting pot.
7 4
Professionalism seemed to embrace meritocracy and offered the promise of
training as a way for new immigrants to find their way into the center of society.
75
Anthropologist Franz Boas and his students criticized modern America as
devoid of culture. It left individuals starved for meaning and emotion or spiritual
fulfillment.76 Boas' critique of competitive individualism drew on the Romantic
emphasis on both the intensity of personal experience and the reunion of self and
community.77 Rejecting the social Darwinian assumption that race determined
individual characteristics, Boas sought to prove that individuals were a product of
their culture and environment. Influenced by Boas, social scientists in the
interwar period researched the power of culture to shape individuals and the
variety of forms of human organization. Social structure, according to these
scholars, was critical to individual development.78 Implicit in these studies was a
critique of economic individualism and an argument for a planned social
structure with strong communal elements, which left room for individuals to
grow and develop in their own unique (but socially productive) way.
79
Social anthropology and institutional economics were edging toward a critique
of capitalism, a recognition of the fundamental importance of culture and society
in shaping individuals. A radical-or at least reformist ideology-informed the
social sciences and a fundamental assumption that something more than
economic efficiency and self-interest lay at the heart of modern society.80 Talcott
Parsons grew up in this intellectual climate and developed what became known
as structural-functionalist sociology.81 Built on the premise that society requires
more than rational self-interest, Parson's theory posited a social, communal
world of shared values, which shaped and in turn was shaped by its constitu-
ents.8 2 Parsons rejected the notion that individuals were motivated solely by
economic self-interest.8 3 In particular, Parsons echoed Emile Durkheim's argu-
74. The term "melting pot" comes from a play written by Israel Zangwill in 1908, which celebrated cultural
integration and assimilation.
75. Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Julius Henry Cohen and the Professions as a Route to
Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33, 37 (2012) [hereinafter Roiphe, A History ofProfessionalism].
76. See BRICK, supra note 47, at 86-90.
77. See generally RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1780-1950 (1958) (explaining the emergence
and development of the terms culture and society).
78. For a description of Boas' influence on social thought, see MARVIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHORPOLOGI-
CAL THEORY, 250 89 (1967).
79. See WILLIAMS, supra note 77, at 11; BRICK supra note 47, at 86 120.
80. See generally HASKELL, supra note 2; Ross, supra note 6.
81. See ABEL, supra note 33, at 34 39.
82. See Id.
83. See Id.; BRICK supra note 47, at 121 51; TALCOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM41 (1951).
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ment that professional societies and occupational groups were critical in
sustaining ethical practices and evolving common values.84 Not only was
Parsons partial to the way in which professions stood apart from the market, but
he also insisted that the model could be extended to other occupations. He argued
that the non-market values might extend beyond professionals to other areas of
social life. Ethics and mores were all immanent but they lacked the necessary
institutions to give them the life and power to shape the social order.
8 6
Critics understood that self-interest proved an obstacle to the pursuit of social
welfare. Pragmatists at heart, many critics expressed concern that those with
power would seek their own enrichment rather than the good of all. The only
hope was ethics and expertise. Professionalism fit in to the political and social
rhetoric of the time and fed on both its aspirations and fears.8 7 As America passed
World War I, the faith in absolutes and the necessity of progress wavered.88
Optimism survived but it was tempered with a new kind of realism. In this
context, the professions played an even more crucial role. As cultural critic
Walter Lippmann suggested, social reformers had to accept reality. In his
masterful book on a group of progressive era intellectuals, Louis Menand argues
that pragmatism was a distinctly American movement because it focused on facts
and reality without an accompanying resignation to accept the world as it was.89
To bring a scientific attitude to the constantly shifting realities, the pragmatists
argued, we need experts who are connected to the facts, to the real world.
Lawyers, as Oliver Wendell Holmes would remind us, were precisely this type of
expert.90 By nature, lawyers encounter the world's problems and bring expertise
to bear on facts.91 But expertise was not simply a technocratic understanding of
government and business, but also an empirical understanding of psychological
and social welfare.92 Professionalism thrived, in part, because experts were
considered critical not only for their understanding of complex facts, but also for
84. See Talcott Parsons, The Profession and Social Structure, 17 SOCIAL FORCES 457,457 67 (1939); STEVEN
LuKES, EMILE DURKHEIM, His LIFE AND WORK 16 24 (1985); EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC
MORALS 23 25 (1957).
85. See generally Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 370-79 (1964).
86. See Talcott Parsons, Remarks on Education and the Professions, 47 INT'L J. OF ETHICS 365, 365469
(1937).
87. Id. at 73.
88. World War I is commonly seen as an important divider, a moment in which the largely white,
middle-class progressive movement shifted to a more xenophobic and preservationist attitude. The international
focus brought with it a fear and hatred of outsiders, which was only a latent part of the earlier reform movement.
See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (1983).
89. See generally MENAND, supra note 38, at ix-xii.
90. See generally Id.
91. See generally Id.; BRICK, supra note 47, at 52.
92. BRICK, supra note 47, at 69.
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their ability to use those facts to envision a new and better community.93 New
Deal liberalism was in some ways the culmination of the earlier decades'
experiment in social planning.94 This new form of liberalism embraced an active
state as long as it was in the hands of expert policy elites.95 Thus, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt ultimately put a significant amount of John Maynard
Keynes' economic vision into effect.9 6 By President Roosevelt's second term, the
New Deal turned the assumption that large scale economic spending could help
cure a sluggish or failing economy into public policy.97 When the mobilization of
the United States' economy for World War II began to pull the country out of
recession, Keynes' vision seemed vindicated, and most people at the time took an
active government with a robust welfare state for granted. The basic premise
persisted through the 1960s and an essential optimism accompanied it despite the
injustices and setbacks.98
The rise of totalitarian regimes around the world posed a threat to the
dominance of social sciences. Fascism, Nazism, and the Soviet regime's abuses
called out for a moral and absolute condemnation. The relativism of the previous
decades proved unsatisfying and too weak to stand up to the real evils
confronting the world.99 But the faith in rationalism and science persisted despite
the challenge. 100 After World War II, America's growing confidence as a world
political and economic leader did not substantially change the nature of this
93. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1934) (emphasizing the "social
responsibilities" of individual lawyers and the profession as a whole).
94. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 272 316 (1955); ARTHUR M. SCHLESSINGER,
JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 303 (1958). Scholars have mphasized that the New Deal was a significant
departure from the past. President Roosevelt's commitment to state sponsored capitalism marked a significant
departure from the reform movements of the previous decades. See generally JORDAN SCHWARTZ, THE NEW
DEALERS: POLITICAL POWER IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1994); THEDA SKOCPOL & KENNETH FINEGOLD, STATE AND
PARTY IN AMERICA'S NEW DEAL (1995). The yearning for an idealized American past, with all its nativist
undertones, gave way to a focus on a more inclusive democratic cultural nationalism and the growth of federal
programs and deficit spending to address domestic and foreign policy needs. See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE
END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995) [hereinafter BRINKLEY, END OF REFORM];
MORTON KELLER, REGULATINGA NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (1994).
95. DAVID STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL
POLITICS 25 27 (2012).
96. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 218 (1977). Scholars have, however, pointed out
how marginal Keynes was during most of Roosevelt's presidency. The policies Roosevelt adopted were
primarily driven by practical concerns rather than rooted in academic theory. BRINKLEY, END OF REFORM, supra
note 94, at 76-77.
97. BRINKLEY, END OF REFORM, supra note 94, at 25.
98. BRICK, supra note 47, at 5; see RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 1 14.
99. See generally PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 56, at 159 96.
100. PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 56, at 236. Some scholars, uch as Leo Strauss,
called for a return to natural law theories and absolutes, which might have crowded out the social sciences. But
even after the horrors of Nazi Germany and European fascism, American intellectuals tended to embrace what
historical Edward Purcell calls "scientific naturalism," the understanding of truth as a series of testable
hypotheses.
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debate.101 While conservative economists revived theories about a purely
market-driven economy, most critics continued to develop policies based on the
importance of deficit spending and cultural nationalism. The reform-minded
pragmatism of the earlier decades evolved to emphasize pluralism and relativism.
The authoritarianism of Nazism, European fascism, and even America's home-
grown McCarthyism was linked with absolutism and theories of natural rights,
while democracy thrived on relativism and pluralism. Social liberalism, the
sciences, and expert elite thrived despite the international and domestic threats of
the 1940s and 50s.
10 2
Even those with conservative tendencies, like economist Joseph Schumpeter,
observed that capitalism was a weak organizing principle because its social
institutions corroded. 10 3 Capitalism, according to Schumpeter, contains the seeds
of its own "creative destruction," and ultimately gives way to some form of
corporatism or socialism.10 4 Intellectuals, in his mind, play a key role in this
transition, formulating the critique, which ultimately forces the gradual but
revolutionary transition. 105 The anti-communist advocacy group, the Congress
for Cultural Freedom, attempted to forge a post-war consensus in support of the
US foreign policy during the Cold War, but at the same time it proffered a
platform in favor of social democracy. 106 With a more celebratory tone, those on
the left-like economist Karl Polyani-argued that economies are inevitably
shaped by culture.10 7 He celebrated the fact that capitalism had given way to a
deliberate and ethical control over economic life. 108
Despite the important shifts and changes, from the late nineteenth century
through the 1950s and 60s, the call for radical change and reformist agendas
shared a commitment to subordinating the economic realm to the social. The
growing radical proposals assumed that the economy would be subject to the
values of the collective will.109 Increasingly, technology and science played a
critical role. With echoes of Veblen and James, thinkers like Daniel Bell argued
that intellectuals would become increasingly powerful. The university would
play a key role as science and research became central to social planning. 110 The
faith in the power of the intellectual to bring virtue and truth to democracy grew.
Veblen had hoped to democratize education to make intellectual pursuit
101. Of course there are many important breaks in the long period from the Progressive Era to the 1960s, but
for the purposes of this Part of the article, I am emphasizing one aspect of intellectual, political, and cultural
thought, which remained fairly constant.
102. See PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 56, at 233 73.
103. BRICK, supra note 47, at 157 58.
104. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 86 (1943).
105. See id. at 310.
106. See generally H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIETY (1977).
107. See generally Karl POLYANI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 46 (1944).
108. Id. at 151 53.
109. BRICK, supra note 47, at 196.
110. Id.
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accessible to all. By the 1950s, the democratic view subsided, and conservatives
articulated a new view that the small class of intellectuals ought o govern.1 11
As the 1960s drew to a close, neoliberals like Milton Freidman had gathered
momentum. Neoliberals pushed towards an increasingly strict laissez-faire
vision.1 12 Part of the project of the neoliberals had been to link the Progressives
and New Deal liberals with communism and socialism. In the 1920s and 30s, the
communist ideal was still possible, part of some utopian fantasies, but by the
1950s the link proved devastating. The abuses of the Soviet Union were real and
vivid and the Cold War rhetoric fueled the popularity of the neoliberal
worldview. 
1 13
II. THE FRACTURE OF THE SOCIAL VISION
What happened next is complicated. By the 1970s and 80s, the obsession with
the social fractured. A market understanding of voluntary rational actors
displaced the emphasis on an independent social realm.1 14 As Margaret Thatcher
articulated in 1980, "There is no such thing as society .... There are individual
men and women and there are families."' 1 5 We lost the faith in government in the
hands of experts or other scientifically run institutions to solve the ills of society.
The solution to the country's ills was increasingly framed in terms of markets and
choice.1 1 6 The entire concept of freedom shifted to a consumer understanding.
The freedom to work and sell one's labor no longer carried much meaning.
Instead freedom was understood as the ability to define who we were through
symbols that could be bought and sold.1 7 The idea of society itself receded,
subsumed by the economy. This section discusses three selected causes of this
shift, which are particularly relevant to the fate of professionalism: the failure of
Keynesian economics to explain the unique economic downturn in the 1970s, the
turn against experts on both the left and the right, and the declining faith in
government, institutions, and hierarchy in general.
A. FROM KEYNES TO FRIEDMAN
Part of the story lies in the failure of Keynesianism to account for the massive
economic downturn in the early 1970s. Macroeconomics had tied itself to
predictive models that failed to account for the nature of the recession. 18 None of
the economic models imagined that inflation and unemployment could coexist to
111. PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 56, at 242.
112. See generally JONES, supra note 95, at 134-80.
113. JONES, supra note 95, at 144.
114. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 41.
115. Id. at 219.
116. JONES, supra note 95.
117. BAUMAN, supra note 63, at 44.
118. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 49.
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such a staggering degree, but the combination of economic stagnation and
inflation, which came to be known as "stagflation," belied those theories.
Economic thinkers like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman used this political
fault line to argue that the error lay in assuming that the government, or any other
institution, could solve social ills.11 9 They developed a free market ideology
based on individual liberty and limited government. Freedom became synony-
mous with a rational self-interested actor largely uninhibited in the competitive
marketplace. 120
Many seized on the counter-narrative of neoliberalism when the older model
lost its explanatory power. Frederick Hayek, Karl Popper, and Ludwig Von Mises
had developed a different theory in the years following the war. They argued that
New Deal liberalism resembled the collectivism of Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Bloc. That is, the same threat to liberty and freedom, which plagued Europe,
resided in our own concept of the welfare state. 121 The idea that experts could
plot the ideal social structure was fueled by hubris, according to neoliberal
thinkers. No one could achieve that level of knowledge about social and
economic preferences. 122 No one could account for the constant shifts in both
conditions and desires. 123
Liberals, like John Dewey, responded to this allegation by arguing that
relativism itself was the antidote to totalitarianism. 124 The evils of Nazi Germany
and fascism lay in their authoritarian nature, their failure to allow different views
to flourish. 125 Pluralism became an end in itself, rather than a means to the just,
free, and equal society. 126 In other words, freedom of speech and association
became the substance of American values. Pluralism and relativism were what
made America stand apart from the totalitarian regimes abroad. 127 Pluralism and
relativism supported a market view not only of the economy but also of ideas.
Society devolved into a sum of its parts.
Partly unique to neoliberalism was the inextricable link it created between
economic liberty and democracy. In the 1960s, political scientists developed
Public Choice Theory, which extended the utility-maximizing, self-interested
man into the realms of politics and government. 128 Rational choice did the same
in political theory. Scholars like George Stigler, James Buchanan, and Gordon
119. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
(1962).
120. Id. For a discussion of Hayek and Friedman and the implication for culture and ideology in the late
twentieth century, see generally JONES, supra note 95.
121. JONES, supra note 95, at 32 33.
122. JONES, supra note 95.
123. Id. at 109.
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Tullock argued that politics is not separate from the economy, and political
decisions are no different from market choices.12 9 Public Choice theorists
insisted that regulation does not work in the public interest. Law and regulation is
instead the product of a competition in which an interest group has managed to
capture the government for its own purpose.130 The entire notion of public
interest and public administration were a sham, a cover for regulatory capture.
Neoliberal economics and public choice theory together chipped away at the
notion of a robust public sphere or common values. The pluralism of political
scientists on the left, like Robert Dahl, similarly rendered the notion of a shared
social ground difficult if not impossible to conceive. 131 Social liberalism was
built on different premises, and professionalism, with its emphasis on suppress-
ing individual self-interest for the good of all, could not survive this shift
unchanged.
In addition to the failure of the Keynesian model of state intervention and a
planned social response to the economy, the recession in 1973 helped destroy the
general optimism that lay at the heart of the social project. The focus on
coordinating the social realm to make a more inclusive and just democratic state
rested on the assumption that economic progress was on some level inevitable.
The country was getting richer and the remaining goal was to make sure that the
community was as equal, fair, and just as possible. Stagflation not only
undermined the premise that managing society though careful planning was the
best way to ensure economic gain, it also left a country anxious about its position
in the world.
B. THE TURN AGAINST EXPERTISE
The reduction of the concept of society into its constituent parts was triggered
by configuration of different causes. The language with which the country
understood the relationship between individuals and the larger circles in which
they operate changed. In the midst of the shift, the professions, which had
occupied such an exalted status, lost their ground. Not only was the notion of a
coordinated public goal discredited, so too were the role of experts and
professionals in helping to obtain that ideal.
Keynesian economics was built around the power of the expert. There was no
set of social ills that science and knowledge could not solve. 132 A product of his
time, Keynes believed that expertise offered the solution to any political, social,
or economic problem. 133 Particularly in the 1950s, the intellectual, scientist, and
129. JONES, supra note 95.
130. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL JOURNAL OF ECON. AND MANAGEMENT SCI.
3, 4-6 (1971); JAMES BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 3-11 (1962).
131. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (19
6
1).
132. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 288 (1926).
133. JONES, supra note 95, at 182.
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expert seemed to be gaining increasing prominence. Universities, think tanks,
and private organizations rose to power and prestige.134 Neoliberal economic
theory was built on a strikingly different image of the expert. Corrupt and venal,
the bureaucrat wasted resources and interfered with efficiency.
135
Public Choice Theory was an extension of neoliberal economic theory-but it
also involved a critique of the Progressive, New Deal view of government. The
idealistic view of experts and professionals was inaccurate. Like any other group,
professionals were operating in their own self-interest. They were monopolies or
cabals disguised as something else.
The rise of the neoconservative economic and political worldview occurred at
the same time as a massive distrust of government on the left. Just as the right
criticized experts and professionals as self-interested actors pursuing their own
monopolistic agenda at the expense of others, so too did the left. Of course the
rhetoric on the left was different-but experts and professionals, who in the first
half of the century had been viewed as the answer to the myriad social ills, now
seemed complicit in the problems of inequality and injustice. 
136
In 1973, Ivan Illich, one of the most prominent social thinkers on the left to
criticize the professions, argued that expertise created a divide between workers
and their work. 137 While technology promised a relief from drudgery-and more
efficient use of economic resources-it also threatened popular democracy and
the ability of ordinary citizens to solve their own problems. 138 Illich argued that
the New Deal may have provided a check on corporate power, but it set up its
own hierarchy based on knowledge and expertise. 139 In other words, reigning in
corporate power came at the price of true equality. 140 Illich argued that expertise
destroyed social relationships, the key to just and equal society. 141 Structures like
health care and public education shifted decision-making and interaction to
anonymous bureaucracies, stripping individuals of important social relations and
meaningful connections to others. Modern economic and political structures, in
which experts make central planning decisions, foster abundance and social
mobility at the expense of creativity and personal meaning. 142 Illich turned to the
134. Id.
135. JONES, supra note 95, at 182. As Richard Hofstadter pointed out at the end of the 1950s, this
anti-intellectualism had roots in American culture. See generally Richard Hofstadter, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN
AMERICAN LIFE (1963) (discussing the ways in which anti-intellectualism run through the history and culture of
America).
136. BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 80-129 (1976); Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight ofAdministrative
Law, 1985 DUKE L. J. 427, 439-441 (1985).
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law as an antidote to the bureaucracy of modern American life. 143 He saw the
prosaic and gradual resolution of everyday problems as the hope for bypassing
the forms of expert bureaucracy. But Illich worried that professional lawyers and
judges stood in the way, once again substituting experts for what should be
common-sense individual judgment. 
144
Not everyone agreed with Illich. Some found his prescriptions bordering on
the absurd. A return to rugged individualism and a rejection of modern
technology would not itself bring about a better world. 145 But even those who
criticized Illich's rather extreme conclusions did not try to argue that the doctor,
lawyer, or social scientist held the key to the modern social world. 146
The Marxist-Weberian critique of professionals was oddly consistent with its
conservative counterpart. While entirely distinct in both its tone and conclusions,
it shared many of the same assumptions. Professionals, sociologists, and other
experts were engaged in a pernicious project of social control. 147 These groups
gave the illusion of freedom and meritocracy in a world in which caste was
inevitable.148 Professions were state supported monopolies. They worked
together to keep outsiders from entering the profession and deepen the divide
between the elite and immigrants, women, and minority groups.
On a practical level, Ralph Nader issued a number of reports in the 1970s
exposing government bureaucracy as a collection of self-interested "experts"
who operated not in the public interest but rather out of a selfish concern over
their own power and status.14 9 The Federal Trade Commission, for instance,
spent public funds on empty public relations gestures, while it protected large
business interests. 150 Nader accused the government of cronyism and exposed
bureaucracies as unresponsive to consumer needs. 151
In 1979, Randall Collins wrote a book entitled, The Credential Society, in
which he argued that the professions' claim to serve the public was merely a guise
which enabled lawyers and doctors to justify their self-interested status-hungry
143. Id. at 101-02.
144. Id.
145. Robert Solo, Review, Medical Nemesis by Ivan Illich, 11 J. OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 915, 915-917 (1977).
146. Id.
147. See e.g., RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 82; BERNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 9 10; LARSON,
supra note 9; JEFFREY L. BERLANT, PROFESSIONS AND MONOPOLY (1975); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL
DOMINANCE (1970); ALVIN W. GOULDNER, THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS
(1981).
148. AUERBACH, supra note 33. Sociologists followed Auerbach but focused more on how the profession
served its own economic and social interest at the expense of clients and the public. See generally ABBOTT,
supra note 18; RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 20 (1989).
149. EDWARD F Cox ET. AL., THE "NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969). Nader's
students were labeled "Nader's Raiders" by the media. They helped research and publish the report. JUSTIN
MARTIN, NADER: CRUSADER, SPOILER, ICON 75-90 (2002).
150. Cox, supra note 149.
151. Id.
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conduct.15 2 Collins claimed, "The 'altruistic professions' are among the highest
paid, and their 'altruism' gives a further payoff in the form of status and
deference." 
1 5 3
The feminist critique of the late 1960s and 70s similarly faulted the male
dominated professions for perpetuating the hierarchy that subordinated women.
Doctors were the target of a particular form of 1970s feminism, which celebrated
female sexuality and criticized the way in which women's bodies had been
objectified and made to seem dirty or shameful by a male-dominated medical
profession.15 4 Promoting midwives and self-examination, this new radical
feminism rejected the objectivity of science and knowledge. 155 Post-structuralism,
which gained increasing popularity on the political left, argued that binaries
themselves were responsible for female subordination and the only way to
liberate women was to disrupt those categories. 15 6 Science itself was seen as part
of the history of domination. Experts and professions were responsible for
deification and perpetuation of these sorts of binaries and categories, which
entrenched a patriarchal system.
The assault on the professions on the left was accompanied by a critique of the
concept of society. Society was too complex to reduce to one set of shared values.
The consensus ideology of the previous decades masked a class and race-based
hegemony. 157 The Progressive Era's fixation on assimilation promoted the values
and agenda of the emerging white middle class while masking this self-interest as
a meritocratic openness to new immigrants and minorities.15 8 Suddenly, the
project of the progressives and the reformist generations that followed looked
more anti-democratic than liberal. Critics employed the language of individual-
ity, selfhood, and autonomy to expose the goals of the previous generations as
naive, at best, and self-interested and elitist, at worst.
C. LOSS OF FAITH IN GOVERNMENT, INSTITUTIONS, AND HIERARCHY
McCarthyism laid the groundwork for the turn against government and broad
theories of social reform. The specter of absolutism led those in favor of
empirical approaches to democracy to shy away from broad absolute theories.
152. RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION
(1979).
153. Id. at 136.
154. BARBARA EHRENREICH AND DEIRDRE ENGLISH, WITCHES, MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A HISTORY OF WOMEN
HEALERS 25 31 (2d. ed. 2010).
155. Id.
156. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990);
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (1988).
157. See, e.g., John Higham, Changing Paradigms: The Collapse of Consensus History, 76 J. AM. HIST. 460,
460-66 (1989) (describing a historical approach that rejected the idea that Americans share a common set of
values in favor of an approach emphasizing the central role of race, gender, and class).
158. Roiphe, A History ofProfessionalism, supra note 75, at 38.
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Relativism took a conservative turn. Critics began to fear too much moralizing in
political life. Fearful that morality would corrupt public institutions and descend
into fascism, they grew suspicious of policies that seemed too radical or
ideologically driven. 
159
The high level critique of social planning and expertise on the left and the right
did not fully grab the imagination of the public until the 1970s. Something
happened in the 1960s, which leant the theory the proper environment in which to
thrive. The 1960s was in many ways the culmination of the earlier pre-war
period. 160 Optimism characterized the public mood even amidst he intense social
conflict and disagreement of the era. Lyndon Johnson's Great Society was a
vision in social planning. It was both ambitious and full of optimism about the
potential for government, in the hands of experts, to help achieve equality and
justice. 161
Social movements in the early 1960s were similarly full of utopian visions of a
just and fair future for the country. The push for individual self-discovery and
self-fulfillment co-existed with ambitious and grand visions of the collective. 162
The civil rights movement, feminism, and other social movements were inclusive
in nature. For the most part, they sought to perfect American society by making
its promise accessible for all. By the end of the decade, however, the tenor of
social protest had changed. 163
In the 1960s, the country still celebrated the abundance of the previous
decades. In many ways, America basked in its success, and protest itself was born
from the optimism of the decade. 164 But the gradual recognition that America had
deceived its citizens and dragged them through an unjustifiable war permanently
transfigured the country and its attitude toward government, structures, institu-
tions, and power in general. Mass war protests, a growingly intense civil rights
movement, feminism, a new youth culture, and other increasingly radical social
movements replaced the complacency, optimism, and celebratory tone of the
previous years. Unsurprisingly, social thought in the late 1960s abandoned its
focus on grand unifying theories, faith in scientific principles and the inevitability
of progress and success. Social conflict and dissent marked a new national mood.
Fear, skepticism, and distrust of institutions of government and other hierarchical
159. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 56, at 253 54.
160. See generally BRICK, supra note 47 (discussing the intellectual shift to a market ideology in the 1970s);
RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1 (analyzing the changes that occurred in American culture and
ideology in the last quarter of the twentieth century).
161. See generally JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY 3 33 (1998) (discussing
the principles of the Great Society).
162. See generally MORRIS DICKSTEIN, GATES OF EDEN: AMERICAN CULTURE IN THE SIXTIES (1977).
163. See id. at 161.
164. See id. at xix.
2016]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
structures accompanied the culture of protest. 165
In the spirit of the 1960s, the ideal of social equality and community coexisted
with a new fascination with self-expression and individual self-exploration. In
fact, many felt that it was precisely the individual search for authenticity that
would lead to a better world for all. 166 The feminist catch phrase, "the personal is
political" captured the sense of the urgency of individual self-liberation to the
radical cause. 167 The dulled false consciousness of the older generation had led to
an insipid conformism. The human capacity to experience and create became
critical to the political mission and utopian social vision of many different
groups.
The reality of the Vietnam War and Watergate, along with the failed promise of
so many hopeful visions and the economic depression of the early 1970s,
changed the nature of the debate. Social movements were increasingly radical
and splintered. The hope for integration, justice, and equality seemed largely lost
as each group pursued its own agenda. The rhetoric of self-liberation of the 1960s
survived but largely divorced from the creative social vision, which had
accompanied it. 
168
The movement for racial equality staggered as busing and affirmative action
demonstrated how stubborn and complicated the problem was. 169 The increas-
ingly radical and separatist teachings of Malcolm X and the Black Panthers
replaced Martin Luther King, Jr.'s hopeful rhetoric. 170 The Great Society left the
nation with an expanded welfare system but no real solution to the massive
inequality in wealth and opportunity. The New Left, which had maintained an
uneasy peace with President Johnson, gradually grew more hostile to bureau-
cracy, centralization, and the state.171 A feminist movement whose focus had
been rights, equality, and inclusion tended to be more radical in its rejection of
hierarchical structures and the very notion of family.
165. Even in the early 1960s, the New Left criticized institutions such as government, the military, and
corporations. Increasingly, it seemed that these organized and hierarchical structures were destroying individual
development, fostering apathy, and preventing democratic participation. BRICK, supra note 47, at 204.
166. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Social Thought, 35 AM. Q. 80, 83 (1983).
167. Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: WOMEN'S LIBERATION 76
(Shulamith Firestone & Anne Koedt eds., 1970).
168. Id.
169. The Supreme Court ushered in an era of busing when it ruled that requiring children to go to schools in
neighborhoods other than their own was an appropriate remedy to segregation. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970). Just four years later, however, the Court ruled that districts were
not responsible for integrating schools through districts unless the segregation had been intentional. Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). This decision effectively exempted suburbs from the desegregation mandate.
170. Compare MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X, with A CALL TO CONSCIENCE: THE
LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001).
171. BRICK, supra note 47, at 206.
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In his famous piece, Tom Wolfe labeled the 1970s, the "Me Decade."172 Of
course, Wolfe's popular rhetoric was exaggerated and reductive, but there was
some truth to it as well. Erica Jong's best-selling novel, Fear of Flying-which
was an allegory about self-liberation and the transcendent nature of personal
exploration-captured a national mood. 173 This new obsession with discovering,
re-making, and re-modeling one's self could be seen as a kind of self-indulgent
narcissism. Personality was the central pursuit, a project of infinite choice.
Feminists and others on the left criticized the categories of "male" and "female"
as themselves a product of patriarchy. The notion of communal life, which had
fueled the radical elements of 1960s politics, seemed increasingly problematic as
critics identified hierarchies and power dynamics within those groups. The
self-interested rational man at the center of neoliberal understanding of both
economics and politics began to pervade understanding of culture and identity on
the Left as well.
174
Meanwhile, the Right revolted against the radicalism of the 1960s, preaching a
return to traditional religious and ethical absolutes and a rejection of relativism.
The New Right reacted to feminism, youth culture, and other radical movements,
denouncing the individual unmoored from family, religion, and tradition.
Conservatives did not posit a global, national, or political answer. They
advocated instead a return to family and neighborhood, church and community, a
vision that President Ronald Reagan would ultimately capture with his folksy and
local view of American promise. 
175
The Right capitalized on unpopular school busing by characterizing segrega-
tion as a product of color-blind meritocratic individualism rather than structural
racism. 176 Tapping into the concerns of disaffected middle-class whites and using
the language of rational individualism, conservatives successfully resisted
integration. The agenda was successful in part because it drew on the market
language of meritocracy to lend moral legitimacy to racial privilege, which
seemed increasingly in jeopardy. 177
The Right used the 1950s anti-communist rhetoric to criticize not only radical
politics, but also any liberal proposal to use government (or law) to help obtain a
more just, equal, or fulfilling society. Welfare and federal regulation of all sorts
were considered a dangerous collectivism akin to Soviet communism. Anti-
172. Tom Wolfe, The "Me" Decade and the Third Great Awakening, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 23, 1976), http://
nymag.com/news/features/45938/ [https://perma.cc/59NX-3RV6].
173. See generally ERICA JONG, FEAR OF FLYING (1973).
174. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 39.
175. See RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE, supra note 1, at 30 36.
176. See MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH 310-12
(2007).
177. Id. at 2; see also JOSEPH CRESPINO, IN SEARCH OF ANOTHER COUNTRY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE CONSERVATIVE
COUNTERREVOLUTION 334 (2007); KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 161469 (2005).
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communism and the reaction to the permissive mores of the 1960s allowed the
cultural and economic conservatives to unite despite the obvious tensions and
disagreements. The left, having embraced relativism as the antidote to fascism
had little substantive response. 178
Additionally, the Right used the economic climate to challenge the old vision
of shared values and the responsibility of the government in the hands of experts
to shape society. Leaders of the New Right like Edward C. Banfield argued that i
was the middle and upper-class liberal assumption that the state can and should
solve social ills that ironically perpetuated the problem. This well-meaning but
erroneous premise supported large government programs, which had crippled
individuals in the inner city. 179 The poor lost initiative and self-reliance, the old
traits of capitalist individualism, as the state nurtured a weak dependence on
social programs. 18 0
By the early 1980s, identity increasingly seemed a matter of choice, rather than
something assigned or collectively given. The answers-to the extent that there
were any-lay not in national identity or communal mission but rather in the
authenticity of smaller voluntary groups and the purity of personal ambition and
transcendence.
III. PROFESSIONALISM IN THE 1970s AND BEYOND
In 1973, philosopher and cultural critic Ivan Illich called for deprofessionaliza-
tion.181 In a radical departure from Tawney and Parsons, Illich blamed expertise
for society's ills. 18 2 He reassured his audience that the threat of quackery paled in
comparison to the damage created by professionals, the iatrogenic problems that
accompanied a society, which had grown overly dependent on expertise.
18 3
While the profession itself did not espouse such a radical view, lawyers too
echoed the cultural suspicion of government and the sciences and reconceived a
more modest role for the professions beginning in the 1970s.18 4 This section
argues that lawyers gradually retreated from the prior visions of their role as
society's engineers and instead, equated professionalism with the delivery of
legal services and loyalty to clients. The notion of a public good, or collective
purpose disappeared from lawyers' rhetoric, just as it had from the culture in
general.
178. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 56, at 115 233.
179. See generally EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF OUR URBAN
CRISIS (1971) (arguing that even the best government programs cannot cure the ills of the inner city). For a
discussion of how Banfield's career mirrored the retreat from broad conceptions of society to a market ideology,
see BRICK, supra note 47, at 222 26.
180. BRICK, supra note 47, at 225.
181. See generally ILLICH, supra note 137 (discussing how expertise was the source of cultural malaise).
182. ILLICH, supra note 137, at 67.
183. Id. at 67.
184. Lawrence E. Walsh, President's Page, 62 A.B.A. J. 687, 687 (1976).
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A. CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING
In the 1970s, scholars of the profession largely rejected what they labeled the
paternalistic attitude of a previous generation of lawyers. According to this
critique, the professional traditionally substituted his own better judgment and
values for that of the client. Instead, theorists advocated "client-centered
lawyering."1 5 In this approach, the lawyer's role was seen as translator and
facilitator rather than expert. The lawyer's perspective was not better than the
client's and his job was to preserve the client's dignity and autonomy as the
lawyer helped the client navigate the legal system.18 6 The client-centered
approach instructed that clients ought to set priorities and make decisions, not the
lawyer. This approach mirrored and reinforced a more humble role for
professionals. It reflected and embodied the fear of elitism and the growing
sensitivity to power dynamics in social relations in general and in professional
relationships in particular. It was a symptom of the decline in the faith in
expertise to solve problems and a kind of market understanding of the lawyer's
role as facilitator or translator of individual interest. The lawyer, in essence, gives
the individual access to the competitive market for claims, viewpoints, and legal
positions.
B. PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING
As client-centered theories of lawyering grew in popularity, public interest
lawyering found itself increasingly under attack. Lawyers in the 1960s had
organized around causes, and they purported to speak for the social interest.
Environmental groups, consumer protectionists, and women's rights activists
used law to achieve what they perceived as shared goals. Public interest groups
and their lawyers hoped to use law to create a better, more equal, just, and
nurturing society. 18 7 But in the 1970s, critics observed that the "public interest"
was in the eye of the beholder.1 8 8 There was no one common interest or set of
185. See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION
IN ADVOCACY 124 272 (1978); see generally DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (advocating client-centered lawyering in the dispute
resolution context); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A
NUTSHELL 54 59 (1976) (discussing the power dynamics involved when a lawyer counsels a client); Gary S.
Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 5 10
(1975-1976) (discussing the importance of psychological needs of clients).
186. See ILLICH, supra note 137, at 67.
187. In the late 1960s, public interest law was created by federal government subsidies to provide legal
services to the poor. The Ford Foundation followed by endowing progressive legal organizations. Comment,
The New Public Interest Lawyer, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071 (1969-1970).
188. Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV.
207, 230 (1975-1976); see also Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1762 75 (1975); Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?:
The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1024 (1969-1970).
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shared values. Everything was subject to debate and competition.18 9 In the
language of Public Choice Theory, there was no one public interest, only groups
vying for power and privilege. In the absence of an idea of the public interest,
Professor Robert Rabin argued, public interest lawyers could still justify their
work "by providing representation to groups that have been unable to organize
effectively to compete in the marketplace of skilled advocates."'1 90 In other
words, the entire notion of public interest law was reframed as a correction for
market failures.
But even this correction was subject to criticism. Theorists argued that lawyers
comprised an interest group just like any other. They substituted their own values
and agenda for those of their clients. Thus critics argued that ctivist lawyers,
asserting the right to speak on behalf of underrepresented groups, misrepresented
their needs and misdirected their concerns to legal forums where they were
ignored, at best. 191
The American Bar Association (ABA) echoed this new justification for public
interest work. Lawyers were not purporting to articulate the "public interest" but
they were improving the market for ideas by making sure the underrepresented
had a voice: 
192
There is no magic in the term "public interest." As lawyers, when we rigorously
and competently represent our own private clients, we are serving the public
interest in the same sense that a member of a "public interest" law firm serves it
by representing rigorously and competently his or her clients. In any adversary
proceeding the opposing sides may each think that they are representing the
public interest, and realistically both may be right. The peculiar obligation
we have as professional advocates is not to any specific cause but rather to the
provision of representation for that cause, whatever it may be. The public's true
interest from the lawyer's standpoint is an adversary system whose decisions
are based on the full exposition of all relevant positions. This is the true public
interest that we who live by the law-that is, we lawyers-must promote. 193
The relativism, which accompanied the new individualism, left no room for a
notion of the public interest. Shared values seemed a myth fraught with power
dynamics. Instead, there was a competition of positions, an adversary market of
interests.
189. See Rabin, supra note 188 and accompanying text.
190. Id. at 230.
191. See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE (1974) (arguing that rights are an ideology that can be used to distract social groups from
political action). Later, scholars would label this the "professionalism problem," the risk that activist lawyers
would substitute their own vision of justice for that of the client. Scott Cummings, Movements in Progressive
Legal Thought (forthcoming); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
192. Robert W. Meserve, President's Page, 59 A.B.A. J. 803, 803 (1973).
193. Chesterfield Smith, President's Page, 60 A.B.A. J. 641, 641 (1974).
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One lawyer, Robert A. Rauch, wrote that the profession should not subsidize
public interest work because the entire concept was too hard to define.
194
Representing the underserved was noble. It helped correct the deficiencies in a
market, which excluded certain individuals and groups. Rauch concluded that
lawyers should not justify pursuing policy objectives, which were merely the
lawyer's ideological agenda masked as a common goal. 195 The new understand-
ing of the role of the professional as representative could not support the broad
policy objectives, defined by lawyers. The social liberal understanding of public
interest lawyering shifted to a market justification.
In the 1970s, scholars similarly criticized the public interest battle for school
desegregation, arguing that the lawyers were substituting their own political and
ideological agenda for those of the black community for whom they were
purportedly fighting. 196 The lawyers had fought for desegregation but at least
some members of the class of African Americans, whom they were supposed to
represent, expressed a stronger interest in the quality of their children's
education.197 Thus, these scholars and critics in the 1970s argued that there was
no common interest, no clear choice to obtain justice, only the interests of
individuals and discrete groups vying for power.
C. THEORIES OF LAWYERING
While some still invoked the ideal of the lawyer as an officer of the court or
arbiter of justice, this notion grew increasingly aspirational-relegated to
graduation and bar speeches. In 1984, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote, "We
still pay homage to the idea that lawyers are officers of the court." 1 98 He followed
with a rhetorical question, "or is that just lip service?"199 The Chief Justice went
on to compare lawyers to healers, seeking to preserve a noble role without having
to invoke what he recognized was already an antiquated ideal.20 0 The analogy to
healers preserved some sense of service while omitting the now problematic
notion of public ideals or values.
Increasingly, the ABA seemed to elide professionalism with the delivery of
legal services. While, from all accounts the bar's record in this area was, and
remains, dismal, the ABA expressed increasing concern about expanding the
delivery of legal services to the poor. Throughout the 1970s, the bar saw this as
194. See Robert J. Rauch, Public Interest Law: Should Lawyers Pick Up the Tab?, 61 A.B.A. J. 453, 453 56
(1975).
195. See id.
196. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
197. See id. at482 83.
198. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 63 (1984).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 66.
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the responsibility of the profession rather than the government. A major focus for
the bar in the 1970s was promoting pre-paid legal services plans, lawyer referral
services, public interest law firms, and pro bono services.20 1 An earlier generation
might have seen the goal of the profession as promoting greater economic
equality, better housing, or education, but the market understanding of the
profession wouldn't allow for such substantive notions of justice.20 2 Watergate
had damaged the reputation of the bar along with the government as a whole. The
response was not to reconceive public service or reimagine the common welfare,
but rather to expand the reach of the profession to lower income individuals.20 3
Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that the profession had a responsibility to
fund public interest law using a purely market understanding of justice.20 4 As
long as everyone has equal access to the courts, the adversary system-or the
market for legal claims - will ensure that justice is done. He wrote,
Not all viewpoints are represented before most decision makers. For the most
part lawyers generally represent clients who are able to pay them. As a result,
many persons are unable to receive adequate legal representation. The effect is
that the decision-making process itself is skewed, and the premises of the
adversary system and of the lawyer's role in the legal process are questioned.20 5
In the new rhetoric, the lawyer's responsibility was to make sure that the market
is working properly. To do so, he has an obligation to make sure that lower
income individuals have access to justice.
As with access to justice, the bar capitulated in a market understanding of the
profession's role as it ultimately accepted lawyer advertising. The bar originally
resisted attempts to allow lawyers to advertise and only changed the ethical rules
when the Supreme Court made it clear that any other course would be
unlawful.20 6 By the mid-1970s, however, the bar embraced the notion that
advertising was desirable because it promoted the dissemination of information
201. See James D. Fellers, State of the Legal Profession: Annual Report of the President of the American Bar
Association, 61 A.B.A. J. 1053, 1053 (1975); Lawrence W. Walsh, President's Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 1005, 1005
(1975); James D. Fellers, President's Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 395, 395 (1975); Chesterfield Smith, President's Page,
59 A.B.A. J. 921, 921 (1973).
202. Rebecca Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism, 26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POU'Y 193 (2015).
203. Meserve, supra note 192.
204. See Thurgood Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice: The Role of the Organized Bar, 61
A.B.A. J. 1487, 1487 88, 1491 (1975).
205. Id. at 1487.
206. See AUERBACH, supra note 33, at 40-53 (explaining that the advertising rules were designed to secure
lawyer status and keep newcomers from entering the profession); Am. Bar Ass'n, Proceedings of 1977 Annual
Meeting of House of Delegates, 102 A.B.A. REP. 542-43 (1977) (reacting negatively to the Supreme Court
decisions holding bans on lawyer advertising unconstitutional); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REv. 689, 694 (1981) (discussing how reluctantly
state bars adopted rules allowing advertising after the Supreme Court decision declaring bans on lawyer
advertising unconstitutional); William Hornsby, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles From the 150 Years War to
Govern Client Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255, 272 92 (2005).
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to consumers of legal services.20 7
In the 1970s and 80s, scholars developed a theory of the lawyer as zealous
advocate.208 They minimized or omitted the professional obligation to society as
a whole. In 1976, Charles Fried wrote a seminal piece entitled "The Lawyer as
Friend," in which he argued that loyalty to the client ought to come before any
other obligation to the court, third parties, or the system as a whole.20 9 Stephen
Pepper similarly argued that lawyers ought to serve their clients regardless of the
morality or legal validity of the client's goals.2 10 Others argued that he value of
the client-centered approach to ethics is the psychological bond between lawyer
and client rather than the benefit it yields in truth and justice.2 1 1 Professionalism,
in other words, subtly shifted from the pursuit of common social goals to serving
and ministering to a client.212
The debate about the role of lawyers continues and many scholars have
provided thoughtful responses to this more modest role for lawyers.213 But for the
most part, the conception of lawyer as agent, facilitator, and guardian of the
client's personal autonomy has persisted. Rules remain that reinforce a lawyer's
role as officer of the court,2 14 but most rules emphasize the duty of zealous
advocacy and requirement o defer to client choice.21 5
207. See Charles A. Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Good Beginning but Not Enough, 62 A.B.A. J. 735,
735 39 (1976).
208. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060 (1976); see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (arguing
that lawyers ought to focus on their clients' interest and the adversary system will ensure the just outcome); Jack
B. Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 457 (1972) (arguing that the "central
function of the lawyer a function that he alone is capable of fulfilling in our complex democracy is to stand
beside his client and protect him as an individual.").
209. Fried, supra note 208.
210. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,
11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986).
211. Lawrence Crocker, The Ethics of Moving to Disqualify Opposing Counselfor Conflicts of Interest, 1979
DUKE L.J. 1310, 1323 (1979). Commenters in the 1970s grew increasingly concerned with the psychological
well-being of the individual client and lawyer. They justified the client-centered approach by arguing that it
served the psychological interests of both. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
212. Robert S. Redmount. New Dimensions of Professional Responsibility, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 43, 56 (1978).
213. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 50 92 (1988); See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 7 9 (1998); Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns,
in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 47 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
2000).
214. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULES] R. 2.1 (directing lawyers to use moral as
well as legal considerations when counseling a client).
215. See MODEL RULES R. 1.3 (diligence); MODEL RULES R. 1.7 (conflicts); Russell G. Pearce, The Legal
Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1339, 1361 62 (2006) (discussing how the Model Rules embrace an adversary ethic).
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CONCLUSION
Contemporary scholarship urges its readers to view the profession as a
business and regulate it accordingly. Some propose allowing clients to contract
around their lawyers' ethical obligations.2 16 Others call for deregulation, casting
clients as rational actors purchasing a service, like any other.17
Our current market understanding of society and the role of professionals
within it are not inevitable or necessary. That said, we cannot (nor would we want
to) wish it away or import an older understanding into a world in which it no
longer makes sense. The history of the decline of social professionalism does
help highlight some aspects of the older vision of the professions, which can still
be relevant. It points toward ways to redefine professionalism to regain some of
its vibrancy while shedding its naivete about he power dynamics in American
society in general and professional relationships in particular.
Toward the end of his career, an aging Parsons explained that solidarity
continued to be critical in understanding social order but it did not bind us all
together in blissful agreement.2 18 It was instead, a shifting and evolving way of
understanding ourselves in relation to the diverse groups around us. Rather than
being an idealistic and unrealistic concept based on a mythical consensus, it was,
in fact, suited to the pluralistic reality of modern American life. Parsons
suggested a kind of dialectic where shared values were continually defined
through conflict.2 19 Parsons' own accommodation opens the door for the older
understanding of professionalism. Perhaps, there is something beyond competing
individual interests even after we acknowledge the importance of tolerance, and
the danger of patriarchy and absolutism. When one says that lawyers pursue the
public good, it sounds like a platitude. The concept unravels if we seek consensus
or shared values without understanding how power operates. Consensus can be a
mask for the hegemony of certain powerful groups, their values, and mores. It can
be used to exclude outsiders and maintain the distribution of wealth and power in
society. But, as Parsons suggested, that does not mean we should abandon the
216. See Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client: A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Conflicts of
Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 699, 733 34 (2000).
217. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2008); David
Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of
Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 265 (2004); Deborah Jones Merritt, Unleashing Market
Forces in Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 367, 381 (2013).
218. Parsons emphasized shared values and consensus. The process of socialization involved inculcating a
set of shared values into individuals. See TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 41-44 (1951). But Parsons
embraced a complex understanding of society. His notion of shared values was not static and involved a
sophisticated negotiation of diverse and constantly shifting interests and ideals. See TALCOTT PARSONS, The
Concept of Political Power, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY 297, 308 15 (1967) [hereinafter
PARSONS, Concept of Political Power]. For a discussion of how Parson's work was influenced by Freud and bore
similarity with Michel Foucault, see BRICK, supra note 47, at 141-45.
219. See PARSONS, Concept of Political Power, supra note 218, at 301 15.
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effort altogether. The idea that lawyers should seek the public good should mean
something different now than it did half a century ago but it need not be
meaningless.
When Parsons spoke in his earlier work about social control, he seemed
uncritical.220 It was a good thing from his perspective when people voluntarily
submitted to authority. The professions, in his mind, provided a perfect example.
An individual takes the medicine a doctor prescribes not because the patient is
coerced but because she voluntarily submits to a benign source of authority. The
following generation of scholars accused Parsons of being a reactionary. In light
of post-structuralism, philosophers like Foucault, and the left wing movement in
general, this particular vision seems outdated and naive.221 Now, it is hard not to
see that the more diffuse power is, the more dangerous and insipid a form of
social control.
In a post-Foucauldian world, expertise, science, and the professions can seem
like a source of false consciousness, a threat to liberty, and a means by which
certain forms and hierarchies perpetuate themselves. It is, however, possible that
the professions can also serve to forge a more just and equal society, despite the
obvious tension. Belonging to social groups, willingly giving in to their norms
and structures can be both liberating and threatening. Professions can help
maintain pernicious hierarchies but they can also be a means by which those on
the outside have a voice in establishing new norms to govern them. The
professions are one way in which individuals (both the professionals and those
they serve) are bonded into comprehensive and stable relationships and these
groups and communities enable individuals to make sensible choices and
understand their role in a broader context.
Groups are not singular or monolithic. There are no authentic selves or true
identities. Identities are created in a constant exchange with the social world.222
The professions can serve as a way to help facilitate this exchange. But, lawyers
can only operate in this way if the legal profession is diverse. Several scholars of
the profession have argued that its diversity has been a source of professional-
ism's decline.223 This article offers a counter-narrative. The diversity of the
220. For an interpretation of functional sociologists as apologists for the status quo and hierarchy in society,
see ABEL, supra note 33, at 34-39.
221. ABEL, supra note 33, at 34 39. Other scholars have criticized functionalists as uncritical of the
professions and overly invested in a conventional social order. See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 18; ELIOT
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (1986);
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds., 1992); See generally LARSON, supra note 9.
222. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) (analyzing the
importance of social relationships for the development of identity).
223. See KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 165 383; DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY
ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 212-47 (2011).
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profession is not only its strength but also critical to its survival. It is what offers
the potential for a more democratic and inclusive understanding of public values.
As diverse as the profession gets, it is important if this profession will continue
to serve a more relevant and updated version of Parsons' vision-that it remain
unitary. In some sense the profession is a microcosm of the society in which it
operates-at least hopefully, diverse and pluralistic but not entirely balkanized or
separated into castes.
Observers like Illich criticized expertise as the guise by which a certain group
monopolizes tools that everyone needs to survive.224 But his vision of a society in
which we democratize access to knowledge, eliminate expertise, and live with
the limits on industrial progress never came to be. Expertise survived the assault
but it did not survive unchanged. The new image of the expert is the problem
solver, someone who exercises judgment, embraces teamwork, and demonstrates
the ability to accept responsibility.225 A robust but relevant view of the
professions would have to take this new understanding of expertise as a starting
point.
The professional in this new view is not different from the businessperson in
her selflessness or special ability to ascertain the public good through some feat
of logical thinking. He is not isolated in an ivory tower surrounded by books but
rather enmeshed in the problems of the real world. Professionals do have unique
education, approaches, and experience, which lend them an ability to seek
long-term solutions to complex issues. The notion of the public good is not gone,
but it looks different now-it is not a stable or unchanging consensus but rather a
constantly negotiated and changing point of momentary convergence. The
professional is not extinct but her contribution ought o be understood in different
terms. Given the new emphasis on problem solving, it seems futile and
counterproductive to try to isolate lawyers in the name of professionalism. The
bar has fought outside investment in law firms, litigation finance, and multi-
disciplinary practice on the ground that these innovations will allow others
outside of the profession to erode lawyers' independence and undermine their
professionalism.226 This stance misconceives professionalism as it should be
understood today. Professionalism, if it means anything, is not isolation but rather
dynamic and creative problem solving, which benefits from outside perspective.
It is the creative interpretation of norms in light of facts and experience.22 7
224. See ILLICH, supra note 137, at 10-12.
225. Atul Gawande has been developing this idea in a series of articles published in the New Yorker. See,
e.g., Atul Gawande, Failure and Rescue, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/failure-and-rescue [https://perma.cc/7UD2-GQV2]; Atul Gawande, Personal Best, NEW YORKER (Sept.
26, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/03/personal-best [https://perma.cc/UBG8-KF96].
226. See MORGAN, supra note 24, at 19-49.
227. See Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone
Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2791, 2792 97 (2012).
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This new sort of expert need not be reduced to a market actor, seeking her own
interest or that of her principal. The public good after the advent of Public Choice
Theory cannot be the common denominator, the static values we all share. But it
can still mean something. Professor Kate Kruse writes that lawyers are uniquely
suited to engage in a dialogue.228 Dana Remus argues that the market vision of
lawyers threatens the "relational values" of trust, loyalty, and judgment.229 The
communication between lawyers and clients, who are both enmeshed in facts and
experience, about the meaning of the law is what gives law its legitimacy. Part of
lending it legitimacy is also giving it content and meaning, so on a very concrete
level, lawyers are always engaged in a dialogue about and creating a constantly
evolving set of mutual norms in light of diverse experiences which are also
always in the midst of change. Thus they serve a function, as Parsons
suggested.2 30 But the function is more complex and fraught with danger than he
fully explored.
228. Kate Kruse, Legal Ethics, Jurisprudence, and Legitimacy (draft on file with author).
229. See Remus, supra note 22, at 30 35.
230. See TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
370, 381 85 (1954).
2016]

